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THE CATALYST THEORY MEETS THE
SUPREME COURT-COMMON SENSE
TAKES A VACATION
Abstract: In 2001, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the Supreme Court of
the United States eliminated the catalyst theory from the definition of
prevailing party in relation to two federal statutes. In doing so, the
Court severely restricted the opportunities for plaintiffs to collect
attorney's fees from defendants who change their behavior to meet the
plaintiffs' claims without fully adjudicating those claims. This Note
examines the history of the catalyst theory and prevailing party
decisions, as well as the impact of Buckhannon on fee-shifting, and
argues that a permanent rejection of the catalyst theory would
dramatically chill the vindication of civil and environmental rights by
plaintiffs facing costly litigation. This Note concludes that Congress
should enact legislation that preserves the catalyst theory and that, in
the meantime,, courts should distinguish the fee-shifting provisions at
issue in Buckhannon and thus preserve the catalyst theory in other
statutory contexts.
INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2001, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. u West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the Supreme Court
of the United States excised the catalyst theory from the definition of
prevailing party. 1 The Court specifically invalidated the theory as a
basis for attorney fee recovery in the context of the Fair Housing
Authority Act (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).2 Prior to this ruling, plaintiffs could rely on the catalyst theory
to prove their "prevailing" status if their lawsuits caused defendants
voluntarily to alter their behavior to benefit the plaintiffs. 3
1 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001).
2 Id.
5 See IKasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that a party "need
not obtain formal judicial relief" to constitute a prevailing party, but may receive attorney's
fees by satisfying the criteria of the catalyst theory); Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113
F.3d 1294, 1299 (1st Cir. 1997); Beard v. Tcska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th Cir. 1994);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1994); Little Rock
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Although the Supreme Court had foreshadowed the catalyst the-
ory's demise in dicta in its 1992 holding in Farrar v. Hobby, the Buck-
hannon ruling was nevertheless surprising because it overruled several
decades of established attorney fee theory and contradicted congres-
sional intent.4 Until Farrar, every United States court of appeals had
embraced the catalyst theory.5 After Farrar, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit broke away and explicitly
abandoned the catalyst theory.6
 Thus, by the time Buckhannon came
before the Court, the Justices were poised to resolve a disagreement
among the courts of appeals.?
A permanent rejection of the catalyst theory would dramatically
chill potential vindication of civil and environmental rights. 8 The
Buckhannon decision has already forced lawyers to refuse representa-
tion of worthy claimants who have few financial resources.9 Until the
catalyst theory is reinstated, or an adequate substitute created, public
and private actors will continue to violate the rights of those citizens
least able to defend themselves. 1° In turn, this lack of protection will
decrease the potency of civil and environmental rights."
This Note critically examines Buckhannon and its aftermath. 12
Section I describes the prevailing party origins of the catalyst theory
and key fee-shifting statutes that provide the authority for the theory's
validity. 13 Section II discusses the Supreme Court's prevailing party
decisions leading up to Buckhannon and the abolition of the catalyst
theory." Section HI examines Buckhannon and deciphers the reason-
ing by both the majority and the dissent. 15 Section IV focuses on the
growing Buckhannon legacy, through which plaintiffs have tested the
Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260, 262-63 & 11.2 (8th Cir.
1994).
4 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5 See id. at 602 (stating that most courts of appeals endorse the catalyst theory).
6 3-1 & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en bane) (holding that a party could prevail only by enforceable judgment, consent
decree, or settlement), rer.46 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1993),
7 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02.
8 See, e.g., infra notes 201-223 and accompanying text.
9 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress en-
acted Section 1988, and other fee-shifting statutes, with the intent of alleviating the severe
hardship experienced by nonaffluent plaintiffs with civil rights claims).
10
 See id.
11 see id,
12 See infra Parts 1—V.
IS See infra notes 20-67 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 68-128 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 129-197 and accompanying text.
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extent of any remaining catalyst theory validity. 16 Finally, Section V
discusses the Court's defiance of both common sense and congres-
sional intent in its elimination of the catalyst theory. 17 Section V also
distinguishes other fee-shifting statutes from those in question in
Buckhannon in order to preserve their viability for catalyst plaintiffs."
In conclusion, this Note argues that, just as the harsh consequences of
the American Rule, by which parties bear their own fees, earlier in-
spired passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 (Fees
Act or Section 1988) to award fees to prevailing parties, the Court's
mistaken decision begs a congressional response."
I. BACKGROUND
Although most fee-shifting statutes clearly require that a party
prevail on the merits of a claim to be eligible for fees, they do not
define "prevailing party."20 To overcome this omission, courts have
looked to legislative history. 21 For example, the legislative history of
the Fees Act indicates an inclusive definition of prevailing party. 22 In
the absence of explicit congressional guidance, however, courts con-
tinued to struggle with prevailing party boundaries, which led to the
disagreement among the courts of appeals and, therefore, to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. 23
The statutory prevailing party doctrine evolved from the com-
mon law "private attorney general" doctrine, by which courts awarded
fees to prevailing parties in suits that would both vindicate an individ-
ual's rights and benefit all other similarly situated plaintiffs. 24 For ex-
ample, in 1975, in Souza v. Travisono, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit granted prisoners a right to legal aid and
16 See infra notes 198-244 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 245-283 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 284-313 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 314-327 and accompanying text; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,267-68 (1975) (requiring legislative basis for fee-shifting).
2° See, e.g., Equal Access to justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (A) (2000).
21 See, e.g., Bonner v. Guccione, 178 F.3d 581,594 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding catalyst the-
ory consistent with the legislative history of the Fees Act, H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7
(1976), which requires courts to award fees even if the defendant voluntarily ceases unlaw-
ful conduct).
22 See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
23 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598,605 (2001).
24 SeeAlyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,267 n.42 (1975).
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also awarded them attorney's fees to compensate 'those who by help-
ing protect basic rights were thought to have served the public inter-
est."25 Courts would thus award fees to those individuals who had
acted in the attorney general's stead by litigating a claim in the public
in terest. 26
Prior to the development of the private attorney general doc-
trine, United States courts were guided by the traditional American
Rule, which required individual parties to carry the burden of their
litigation costs and attorney's fees, unless explicit statutory authority
provided otherwise. 27 The American Rule was originally created as a
progressive policy to enable plaintiffs to litigate without fear of fee
liability to defendants. 28 The rule evolved, however, into a barrier be-
tween poorer clients and attorneys who were unwilling to accept the
financial risk of a suit, even if faced with likely success. 29 As courts be-
gan to appreciate the unequal legal opportunities created by the
American Rule, they developed the common law private attorney
general doctrine to compensate a prevailing party's fees and to en-
courage vindication of individual and societal rights." Unlike under
the American Rule, a plaintiff could recover fees by validating the
merits of a claim—thus prevailing. 31
In 1975, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Su-
preme Court rejected the private attorney general doctrine." The
Court held that the judiciary was not authorized to allocate the pecu-
niary burden of litigation, so fee-shifting was valid only when pursuant
to explicit legislation. 33 Accordingly, the environmentalist plaintiffs
could not recover their fees even though they vindicated the public
interest by obtaining an injunction against the construction of the
Alaska pipeline.34
25 512 F.2d 1137, 1139 (1st Cir.1975).
26
 See id.
27 See, e.g., Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270-71 (applying American Rule because of its deep
common law roots and congressional policy).
25 See Martin Patrick Averill, ''Specters" and "Litigious Fog"h The Fourth Circuit Abandons
Catalyst Theory in S-1 & 5-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Board of Education of North
Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2245, 2252 (1995).
29 See id.
'‘) See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Joel H. Trotter, The
Catalyst Theory of Civil Right Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. RES'. 1429, 1431
(1994).
See Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704.
See421 U.S. at 241.
33 See id. at 267-68.
54 See id.
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Congress quickly responded to the Court's implied request for
statutory authority to award fees to a prevailing party by enacting the
Fees Act in 1976. 35 In the Fees Act, Congress explicitly stated its inten-
tion to provide reasonable fees to prevailing parties who brought suit
pursuant to civil rights statutes lacking fee-shifting provisions. 36 As
commentators have noted, this incentive is necessary to avoid the free
rider issue inherent in civil rights litigation—that a citizen naturally
lacks incentive to sue to vindicate the citizen's own civil rights because
those interests will be protected for free if someone else files suit. 37
Thus, to avoid underenforcement of civil rights, Congress codified
the private attorney general doctrine to provide attorney's fees for any
plaintiff who prevailed in a civil rights action. 38
Congress has now promulgated over fifty statutes with fee-shifting
provisions that allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs. 39 The Fees Act itself provides, "In any action to
enforce a provision of . . . this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs."4° In fact, the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA) was enacted specifically to shift fees to those parties who,
even absent adequate funding, filed socially responsible suits. 41 The
EAJA provides, "Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a
court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
fees and other expenses . . . "42 Similarly, the Clean Water Act states,
"The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant
to this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable at-
torney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantively prevail-
ing party, whenever the court deems such award is appropriate."43
Hence, Congress has recognized the need for adequate counsel for
underrepresented segments of society in many fields of the law, and
" 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); see Trotter, supra note 30, at 1431.
36 See Averill, supra note 28, at 2254-55 (citing S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), m.
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5911).
37 See Trotter, supra note 30, at 1433.
" See 42U.S.C. § 1988.
" See id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM, ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF
1976, PUB. L. No. 94-559, § 1988, S. 2278, SOURCE Boolt: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS,
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS app. A, at 220-21 (1976) (listing fee-shifting statutes).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) .
41 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (A) (2000).
42 Id.
43 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
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has responded actively with fee-shifting statutes to encourage vindica-
tion of citizens' rights."
Once courts began to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties,
they had to determine which plaintiffs could be said to have pre-
vailed." Courts naturally extended the prevailing party definition to
include plaintiffs whose claims had forced defendants to alter their
unlawful behavior." In 1970, in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., the first judicial articulation of the catalyst theory, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant
had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but refused to
issue an injunction because the defendant had already ceased the un-
lawful racial discrimination at issue. 47 Even though the defendant
corporation had conformed to the law and established affirmative ac-
tion policies without judicial compulsion, attorney's fees were granted
to the plaintiff because his lawsuit had catalyzed the implementation
of such policies." Consequently, the plaintiff was eligible for fees be-
cause the defendant had corrected its action in direct response to the
plaintiff's lawsuit."
Since this landmark case, courts have included the catalyst the-
ory—in addition to the traditional judgment on the merits, consent
decree, and settlement agreement—within the definition of prevail-
ing party.5° Under the catalyst theory, plaintiffs prevail if their lawsuits
cause defendants voluntarily to alter their behavior to comply with the
demands of the plaintiffs' original claim. 51 For example, a plaintiff
could prevail under the catalyst theory by filing a claim with an ad-
ministrative body that caused the body to revise or repeal the chal-
44 See id.
45 See Parham v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.24 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970); Trot-
ter, supra note 30, at 1934.
46 See Parham, 433 F.2d at 429-30.
47 Id.
46 See id.
49 See id.
" See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that a party ''need
not obtain formal judicial relief" to constitute a prevailing party, but may receive attorney's
fees by satisfying the criteria of the catalyst theory); Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113
F.3d 1294, 1299 (1st Cir. 1997); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th Cir. 1994);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1994); Little Rock
Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260, 262-63 & n.2 (8th Cir.
1994).
m See S-1 & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (defining and rejecting the catalyst theory), reu'g 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.
1993).
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lenged policy, rendering the plaintiff's claim moot.52 Without the
catalyst theory, however, the plaintiff could not recover attorney's fees
because the case would be dismissed for mootness, and thus never
would reach a traditional resolution. 55
Under the catalyst theory, courts have generally required both
that the plaintiffs claim cause the defendant to change a position and
that the claim be legally colorable, rather than a nuisance suit. 54 The
first requirement ensures that the plaintiff is not rewarded for seren-
dipitously filing a lawsuit at the same time that the defendant is con-
sidering a policy change.55 The second requirement prevents a wind-
fall to a plaintiff if a defendant changes a position in the face of a
frivolous suit merely to avoid the stigma of a lawsuit. 56
In the absence of a specific statutory definition for prevailing
party, legislative history indicates that Congress intended the inclu-
sion of such a catalyst doctrine. 57 In fashioning the Fees Act, both
houses of Congress relied on Parham. The House report stated that
"after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the un-
lawful practice. A court should still award fees even though it might
conclude, as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as an in-
junction, is needed."58 In turn, the Senate report noted that "parties
may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights .. .
without formally obtaining relief."" As a result, every federal court of
appeals soon embraced the catalyst theory in matters in which, even
in the absence of final judgment, defendants changed their behavior
towards plaintiffs to comply with the plaintiffs' meritorious claims.°
Plaintiffs invoked the catalyst theory most often after administra-
tive or statutory challenges.° In this setting, either the plaintiff would
dismiss the suit, or the court would determine it moot when the gov-
ernmental body in question revised or repealed the challenged policy
52 Trotter, supra note 30, at 1435.
53 See id.
54 Averill, supra note 28, at 2256 (referring to Nadeau v. Helgetnoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281
(1st Cir. 1978)).
53 See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 280-81.
58 See id. at 281.
" See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5912.
58 H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976).
' S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5912.
59 H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976).
(A) Trotter, supra note 30, at 1435,
fit see id.
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to comply with the plaintiffs claim.62 The plaintiff would then justify a
fee award by noting the defendant's voluntary change in position that
resulted from the claim.° If the court found that the plaintiff had
catalyzed the defendant's alteration of unlawful actions, then the
court would award fees to the plaintiff. 64
After three decades of development, the catalyst theory came
squarely before the Supreme Court in Buckhannon, forcing the Court
to determine whether a plaintiff could constitute a prevailing party by
causing a defendant's change in behavior that benefited the plain-
tiff. 65 The Court had only hinted at the matter in its earlier dicta
definition of prevailing party in Farrar v. Hobby that excluded the cata-
lyst theory.66 The Supreme Court's earlier prevailing party decisions,
however, did not conflict with the catalyst theory and so had led lower
courts to continue the doctrine's application. 67
II. BUCKHANNON'S FOREBEARS
As the definition of prevailing party continued to evolve in lower
courts to include the catalyst theory, the Supreme Court delivered
several opinions that narrowed this definition. 68 In 1983, in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, one of its earliest decisions on the subject, the Court
affirmed that a prevailing party was one who succeeded on "any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing the suit."69 In Hensley, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the treatment and conditions in the
forensic unit of a mental hospital, the lack of due process in the
placement of patients in this very restrictive unit, and the lack of
compensation for institution-maintaining labor." Even though a con-
sent decree resolved the due process claim, and congressional adop-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act mooted the wage claim, the
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 1436 (quoting Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 1980)).
65 See Buckhantzon, 532 U.S. at 605.
66 See 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (holding that a civil rights plaintiff could qualify as a
prevailing party by obtaining an enforceable judgment or comparable relief through a
consent decree—however, the catalyst theory was not before the Court).
67 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 2, 4 (1988) (holding that to prevail a plaintiff
must benefit from defendant's altered policy, and therefore, prisoners who had died or left
custody could not receive benefit from policy allowing magazine subscriptions).
68 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987).
69 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
70 Id. at 426.
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plaintiffs' success on the treatment and conditions claim earned them
prevailing party status." Hence, the Court "generously" deemed that
a party prevails if it succeeds on a significant issue in its litigation. 72
In 1987, in Hewitt v. Helms, the Court continued to award attor-
ney's fees based on the defendant's behavior, rather than the legal
imprimatur resulting from adjudication." In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Scalia commented that a plaintiff could prevail without
receiving a formal judgment if the defendant adopted a change in
behavior to redress the plaintiff's grievances. 74 If the plaintiff had re-
ceived only an interlocutory ruling, however, it was not the stuff of
which legal victories are made," so the plaintiff could not be said to
prevail." Justice Scalia stopped short, though, of requiring a judicially
sanctioned result for prevailing party status." In fact, he stated that
the judicial decree was merely the means to an end, not the desired
end itself, and that the prevailing party inquiry should focus on the
judgment's effect on the defendant, "the payment of damages, or
some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct." 77
He concluded:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially
decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988. A law-
suit sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant
that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought
through a judgment—e.g., a monetary settlement or a
change in conduct that redresses the plaintiffs grievances.
When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed
despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor."
Accordingly, the catalyst theory's focus on the defendant's actions to-
ward the plaintiff appeared to bring the doctrine squarely within the
purview of the Court's definition of prevailing party."
In 1988, in Rhodes v. Stewart, its next attempt to define prevailing
party, the Court noted that the defendant's behavior, even if intended
to benefit the plaintiff, could create a prevailing party only if the
71 Id. at 428.
12 Id. at 435.
7/ 482 U.S. at 761.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 760.
" Id. at 761.
" Id. at 761.
78 Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61.
79 Id.
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plaintiff actually benefited from the defendant's action." The Court
denied the sufficiency of a declaratory judgment to create a prevailing
party by stating that Hewitt did not require that a plaintiff who re-
ceived such judgment be automatically considered prevailing under
Section 1988.81 Instead, a party could prevail only if the defendant's
change in behavior directly benefited the plaintiff. 82 Thus, if two pris-
oners won the right to magazine subscriptions, but then one died and
one was released, they could not benefit directly from the prison's
new policy allowing subscriptions. 83 As in Hewitt, the focus on the de-
fendant's behavior for determining prevailing status comported per-
fectly with the catalyst theory."
In 1989, in Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent
School District, the Court claimed to synthesize the earlier cases.85 In-
stead, the Court appeared to establish a new standard that focused
not on the defendant's behavior, but on the legal relationship be-
tween the parties." The primary question before the Court was
whether a plaintiff needed to succeed on its central claim, or merely a
significant claim, to prevail.° The Court held that success on any
significant issue would suffice to constitute a prevailing party, and
therefore granted attorney's fees to the plaintiff teachers' association
that vindicated the First Amendment rights of public employees in
the workplace and materially altered the defendant school district's
limitations on the teachers' rights to communicate with each other
about union issues. 88 Furthermore, the Court continued in dicta by
reviewing Hewitt and Rhodes and suggested that they stood for the
proposition that prevailing party status depended on a change in the
legal relationship between the parties, not the defendant's behavior. 89
Therefore, the appropriate prevailing party test asked whether there
was a change in the legal relationship between the opposing parties,
and if so, whether it benefited theplaintiff."
88 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
81 Id. at 3.
82 Id. at 4.
88 Id.
84 Id.
88 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989).
88 See id at 792-93.
87 Id. at 784.
88 Id. at 793.
89 Id. at 792-93.
9° Garland, 489 U.S. au 742-93.
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Finally, in 1992, in Farrar v. Hobby, the Court held that "a plaintiff
`prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defen-
dant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." 9" In Farrar,
the plaintiff brought a civil rights action seeking damages in the
amount of seventeen million dollars.92 Because the jury found that
the defendants were not the proximate cause of any injury to Farrar,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
dismissed the action on the merits." The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision with re-
gard to a single defendant, Hobby, and awarded damages of one dol-
lar to the plaintiff. 94 With this final judgment, and his concurrent be-
lief that he was a prevailing party, Farrar applied under the Fees Act
for $300,000 in attorney's fees and costs. 95 The district court then
awarded him these expenses."
In reviewing the district court's decision, a divided Fifth Circuit
declared Farrar's nominal damages at best a technical victory, and
consequently found him not a prevailing party and unworthy of a fee
award.97 Farrar did not prevail because he did not truly benefit from
the one-dollar judgment." The dissent relied on Hewitt, Rhodes, and
Garland in its opinion that a party deprived of constitutional rights
could still be a prevailing party, despite recovery of only nominal
damages."
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's denial of attorney's fees and then, after summarizing its hold-
ings in Hewitt, Rhodes, and Garland, announced a new test to deter-
mine the status of a prevailing party.'" That test required that "the
plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant
from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent
decree or settlement?"' The Court reasoned, as it had in Rhodes, that
the civil rights litigation must result in a "material alteration of the
91 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).
.92 Id. at 106.
" Id. at 106-07.
" Id. at 107.
" Id.
" Farrar, 506 U.S. at 107.
97 Id. at 107-08.
" Id.
"Id. at 108-09.
1 °11 Id. at 105, 109-11.
101 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111.
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legal relationship of the parties.”1 °2 Thus, there could be no material
alteration of the parties' legal relationship until the plaintiff received
a favorable final judgment, consent decree, or settlement.ms
For the case at hand, Farrar was deemed a prevailing party be-
cause the nominal damages judgment was legally enforceable and
thus constituted a material alteration of the legal relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant.'m Unlike earlier cases in which at-
torney's fees depended solely on a party's technical status, however,
fees after Farrar would reflect the magnitude of relief as wel1. 105 Thus,
a plaintiff would first have to cross the threshold of material legal al-
teration and then prove sufficient success to merit fees. 106 Because
Farrar had received a judgment in his favor for one dollar, he ob-
tained prevailing party status, but this nominal sum was deemed un-
worthy of attorney fee recovery. 107
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Farrar, the focus of
the prevailing party inquiry shifted from the defendant's behavior
toward the plaintiff to their legal relationship. 108 The substance of the
legal relationship, however, was still undetermined. The Court did not
explicitly limit prevailing party status only to those suits in which the
plaintiff obtained a final judgment or consent decree:mg Thus, most
courts of appeals held that this dicta provided merely an inexhaustive
list of possible prevailing party postures and continued to interpret
the definition of prevailing party to include the catalyst theory."°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, unlike
the other courts of appeals, discarded the catalyst theory in response
to the Farrar decision.'" In S-/ Cc' S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State
Board of Education of North Carolina, the parents of two special needs
children demanded private school expenses from the Asheboro City
Board of Education (City Board) after the inadequacy of the school's
special programs forced them to send their children to private
1°2 Id.
1°s
	 id.
1" See id.
105 See id. at 115.
106 See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115.
ml See id. at 116.
1118 See id.
1°9 See id. at 111.
110 See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260, 263
n.2 (8th Cir. 1994).
111 S-1 & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'g 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876
(1994).
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schools." 12 The parents demanded these expenses pursuant to the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), which requires "free ap-
propriate public education."'" After denial by the City Board and its
subsequent refusal to hold a due process hearing, the parents peti-
tioned the North Carolina State Board of Education (State Board)
either to compel the City Board to hear their claim or to enact regula-
tions to force a hearing.'" Upon denial of this petition, the parents
filed suit against the City Board, State Board, and the State Board
chair and added a claim for recovery of attorney's fees under the Fees
Act.'"
After the district court granted summary judgment for the par-
ents, and while the appeal was pending, the City Board agreed to re-
imburse the parents for their tuition expenses in exchange for the
parents' dismissal of all claims.'" Although the State Board was not a
party to this agreement, it altered its position and authorized the City
Board's hearing officers to entertain the parents' demand. 117 The
Fourth Circuit then vacated the district court's order as moot and re-
manded to the district court.'" The district court, in turn, awarded
attorney's fees on the basis that the suit had forced North Carolina to
amend its legislation to comply with federal law.'" The Fourth Circuit
originally affirmed the district court's holding, stating that a sufficient
causal nexus existed between the plaintiffs' claim and the state's sub-
sequent legislative about-face."" Rehearing the case en banc, however,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' catalyst theory and held that
they could not qualify as prevailing parties on the basis of postdismis-
sal events.121 Thus, the Fourth Circuit split off from the other courts
of appeals as the first and only court of appeals to refute the catalyst
theory. 122
By 2001, the Supreme Court had narrowed the definition of pre-
vailing party but had not expressly refuted the catalyst theory. 123 In
112 Id.
113 See id. at 161.
114 See id. at 162.
115 Id.
116 See S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 163.
117 Id.
112 See id. at 163.
119 see id.
)2° See id. at 168.
121 See S-I & S-2, 21 F.3d at 49.
122 See id.
123 See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111 (summarizing requirements for prevailing party, but not
rejecting catalyst theory).
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the absence of an explicit mandate from the Court, nearly every lower
court continued to employ the well-established catalyst theory. 124 The
Fourth Circuit's rejection of the catalyst theory, however, prompted
the Supreme Court to revisit its fee-shifting jurisprudence in Buckhan-
non and abolish the catalyst theory for fee recovery under the FHAA
or ADA. 125
The prevailing party inquiry initially focused on a change in the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, such that a
party could prevail under the Fees Act without receiving judicially de-
creed relief. 126 Within five years, however, the plaintiff could meet the
prevailing party standard only through an enforceable judgment
against the defendant. 127 Therefore, the catalyst theory's focus on the
nature of the defendant's behavior toward the plaintiff became less
consistent with the case law as the Supreme Court began to place
more importance on the judicial imprimatur stamped on the claim. 128
III. BUCKHANNON
In May of 2001, Buckhannon Board &' Care Home, Inc. v. West Vir-
ginia Department of Health & Human Resources brought the catalyst the-
ory's validity squarely before the Supreme Court of the United
States. 129 As some had anticipated after Farrar v. Hobby, a split Court
abolished the catalyst theory, at least in the context of the ADA and
FHAA. 13° Thus, to the detriment of the environmental and civil rights
movements, the Court proved many pessimistic commentators cor-
rect. 151
124 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02.
125 See id. at 601, 610.
126 See, e.g, Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61 (holding that the critical factor in the prevailing
party determination was whether the lawsuit provided relief from the defendant to the
plaintiff).
127 Id. at 760-61 (decided five years before Farrar); Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111.
128 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
128
 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
130 Id. at 610; see Trotter, supra note 30, at 1440.
131 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610; P.G. Szczepanski, For a Few Dollars Less: Equity Rides
Again in the Denial of Section 1988 Attorney's Fees to a Prevailing Plaintiff in Farrar v. Hobby, 5
Thaw. Poi RTS. L. REV. 219, 242 (1996) (stating that Farrar had already led to rejec-
tion of catalyst theory in one court of appeals, and had survived in other courts only
through "judicial legerdemain"); Trotter, supra note 30, at 1440 (arguing that the catalyst
theory's inconsistency with Farrar's holding that a party must obtain an enforceable judg-
ment or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement will kill the catalyst
theory).
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The dispute began in 1997, when the West Virginia Office of the
State Fire Marshall (Fire Marshall) delivered to Buckhannon Board
and Care Home, Inc. (Buckhannon) an order to cease and desist op-
erating its assisted living homes. 132 The Fire Marshall delivered this
order because Buckhannon had failed the self-preservation portion of
an inspection when its residents had proven incapable of escaping
dangerous situations, such as a fire, unassisted.'" Hence, the Fire
Marshall imposed the cease and desist order to compel Buckhannon
to comply with state law.'m
In response to the Fire Marshall's order, Buckhannon filed suit
on behalf of its residents, claiming that the self-preservation require-
ment violated both the FHAA and the ADA.'" While Buckhannon's
claim was pending, the West Virginia Legislature passed two bills that
eliminated the self-preservation requirement.' 36 The Fire Marshall
then moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the underlying
claim was moot.ls" Because West Virginia had permanently and effec-
tively removed the offending provision, the United States District
Court for the District of West Virginia agreed with the Fire Marshall
and dismissed the claim)" Thus, it seemed that Buckhannon's claim
had forced the state legislature to alter its position and that of the Fire
Marshall by amending the underlying law.'"
With this apparent victory in hand, Buckhannon filed for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to the prevailing party provisions in both the
FHAA and ADA. 14° Buckhannon based the fee petition on the catalyst
theory, arguing that it had achieved the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's con-
duct."' Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit had earlier repudiated the catalyst theory in S-/ & S-2 By and
Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina, it re-
jected Buckhannon's petition in light of Buckhannon's failure to ob-
tain "an enforceable judgment, consent decree or settlement giving
1" Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
153 Id.
I " Id. (citing W. VA. Code §§ 16-511-1, 16-511-2 (1998)).
135 Id. at 601 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 (FHAA), 12101 (ADA) (2000)).
136 Id.
177
	
532 U.S. at 601.
138 id.
139 , a
140 id.
141 see id.
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some of the legal relief requested. "142 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to resolve the catalyst theory's validity. 145
The Supreme Court held in Buckhannon that a party that relied
solely on the catalyst theory to recover fees could not establish itself as
a prevailing party because it could not show an enforceable alteration
of the legal relationship between the parties. 144 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court first looked to Black's Law Dictionary, which
defines a prevailing party as "' [a] party in whose favor a judgment is
rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded <in certain
cases, the court will award attorney's fees to the prevailing party>." 145
Hence, a plaintiff could not constitute a prevailing party without ob-
taining the judicial imprimatur embodied in a judgment. 146 The
Court then declared this result consistent with its past prevailing party
interpretations, which had required judicially-sanctioned relief. 147
Synthesizing the prevailing party precedent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that previous cases stood for the proposition that
enforceable judgments and court-ordered consent decrees materially
alter the legal relationship between the parties, as is necessary to
award attorney's fees."8 Chief Justice Rehnquist then reasoned that
the catalyst theory did not satisfy these criteria because it "lacks the
necessary judicial imprimatur"149 In a sharp retort to the dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court had never awarded attorney's
fees in the absence of a judicial alteration of actual circumstances. 150
Accordingly, any language from earlier cases that recognized the cata-
lyst theory's validity was dicta. 151
The Court next analyzed the context in which the statutory
authority was enacted and declared that against this background the
legislative history was ambiguous. 152 Even though the House report on
Section 1988 stated that a prevailing party should not be limited only
to plaintiffs who had obtained a " ,*final judgment following a full trial
142 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602-03 (quoting 5-1 & 5-2, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc)).
143 Id. at 602.
144 Id. at 604.
143 Id. at 603.
146 See id.
147 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
143 Id. at 603-04.
199
13° Id. at 605-06.
151 Id.
1 " Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-06.
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on the merits,'" and the Senate report allowed a party to prevail by
"'vindicat[ing] rights through a consent judgment or without formally
obtaining relief,'" the Court found this legislative history ambiguous
in light of the American Rule.' 53 Instead, the Court stated that a legal
vindication of the parties' substantial rights, a goal expressed by the
same House report, could only take the form of a judgment on the
merits. 154
The Court then dismissed Buckhannon's assertions as to the ad-
verse impact of the abolition of the catalyst theory.'" First, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist discarded the petitioner's fear that catalyst theory re-
jection would deter plaintiffs from filing potentially expensive suits. 156
Because Buckhannon had not proffered any empirical evidence that
the Fourth Circuit had hosted fewer civil rights cases since its rejec-
tion of the catalyst theory, the Court discarded the petitioner's con-
cern as unfounded.'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist then jettisoned Buckhannon's fear that
defendants would moot claims by altering their behavior in mid-trial
and reassured the petitioner that an action for damages would con-
tinue to lie even after a defendant had changed behavior. 158 The
Court recognized, however, that equitable relief would be foreclosed
in those cases (i.e. any civil rights or environmental disputes) in which
a defendant mooted the claim by behaving differently to comply with
the plaintiff's demands.'" Even claims for equitable relief, the Court
suggested, would rarely meet the stringent mootness requirement that
it be "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur."'" Finally, the ultimate possibility of
hefty attorney's fees would practically pressure many defendants into
settlement agreements through which plaintiffs could secure attor-
ney's fees.16"
Throughout its opinion, the Court expressed policy concerns to
bolster its holding.
159 Id. at 607 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N.
5908,5912; H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5,7 (1976)).
t" Id. at 608 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 8 (1976)).
BS Id.
156 See id.
157 Bucithannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
158 Id. at 608-09.
159 See id. at 609.
16* Id. at 608-09.
151 Id. at 609.
162 Buchhannon, 532 U.S. at 606-10.
162 First, the Court implied that a non frivolous yet
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meritless lawsuit would compel the defendant to alter a position
merely to avoid the suit's nuisance value.' 63 Therefore, requiring full
adjudication would allow courts to determine the merits of a claim
before awarding a final judgment and its accompanying fees. 164 The
Court similarly suggested that defendants who might otherwise volun-
tarily alter their conduct would refrain from doing so in the face of a
catalyst theory that would hold them financially liable for such a
change. 165 Hence, in rejecting the catalyst theory, the majority seemed
to believe it had removed a barrier, and actually encouraged defen-
dants to voluntarily change their conduct to meet the plaintiff's de-
mands. 166
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg examined the major-
ity opinion's logic and its preference for a judicial signature rather
than the successful resolution of the immediate controversy. 167 The
dissent utilized notions of access to courts, history, precedent, and
plain English to describe the catalyst theory as an integral aspect of
fee-shifting jurisprudence. 168 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the
catalyst theory was necessary to encourage private enforcement of
civil rights and thus further the purpose of fee-shifting provisions. 169
Justice Ginsburg first claimed that Black's Law Dictionary
definition for prevailing party should not be read preclusively.'" She
relied on other instances in which the Court had defined terms more
broadly than Black's."' For example, in 1980, in Maher v. Gagne, the
Court had included a consent decree within the definition of prevail-
ing party, rather than confining it to a final judgment.'" Thus, the
Court could have actively employed a broader definition for prevail-
ing party to include the catalyst theory.'"
163 See id. at 606.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 608.
' 66 See id.
167 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent. See id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).
168 See id. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169 See id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"0 See id. at 628-29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 628-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that in Maher, 448 U.S. 122,129 (1980), the
Court stated that the Fees Act did not require full litigation of the issues or a judicial de-
termination of plaintiff's rights).
17s
	 id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg then referred to instances in which the Court
had awarded fees in the absence of a legitimate final judgment on the
merits.174 For instance, in 1884, in Mansfield, C. & L.M.R Co. v. Swan,
the plaintiffs had prevailed on the merits all the way to the Supreme
Court, where they were stripped of their judgment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 175 Although the plaintiffs no longer possessed a
judgment on the merits, the Court awarded them costs because they
had prevailed in a "formal and nominal sense." Consequently, the
Court had ruled in at least one instance that a party could obtain
costs without obtaining a valid final judgment. 177
Justice Ginsburg next interpreted the purpose of a lawsuit to be
the substantive attainment of actual relief from the defendant, not the
procedural stamp of judicial imprimatur. 178 According to this view, a
plaintiff succeeded by obtaining actual relief—reasoning that com-
ported clearly with the catalyst theory. 179 In fact, Justice Scalia had
noted in Hewitt v. Helms that the goal of the judicial process was the
relief, not the judicial decree that merely provided the means for ac-
complishing this goal.'" Therefore, because Buckhannon secured
continued operation for the assisted living centers, it obtained actual
relief. 181
The dissent continued with an analysis of the congressional his-
tory surrounding the civil rights legislation. 182 The House report on
Section 1988 declared that Congress intended to secure "effective ac-
cess" necessary to protect civil rights for all, especially those incapable
of bearing the financial burden of litigation.'" Additionally, the
House report acknowledged that a defendant could voluntarily cease
an unlawful practice, but that fees should still be granted to a plaintiff
even in the absence of the need for formal relief)" Justice Ginsburg
174 See id. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175
	
id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co, v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379 (1884)).
1 " See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mansfield, 111
U.S. at 388).
177 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
17s See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
179
	 id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
no See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to Hewitt, 482 U.S. 755,761 (1987)).
181 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182 See id. at 635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)).
184 See id. at 638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7
(1976)) (emphasis added by Court).
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concluded that in drafting its civil rights legislation, Congress in-
tended to protect citizens' civil, not legal, rights. 185
Justice Ginsburg next refuted the majority's fears that the catalyst
theory had acted as both a deterrent to rehabilitative behavior and a
form of extortion for clever civil rights attorneys. 186 As to the first
concern, Justice Ginsburg noted that potential defendants should re-
form their conduct before litigation commences or is even threat-
ened.'" The threat of attorney's fees would achieve this goal by deter-
ring violations of civil or environmental rights in the first place.'" In
addition, courts could avoid the extortion issue by including it as a
factor in their discretionary "reasonable" fee determination. 199 By re-
moving this decision from the discretion of other courts, the major-
ity's opinion impugned their abilities accurately to screen out
meritless claims filed for nuisance value.'"
Finally, the dissent interpreted the majority's judicial imprimatur
holding as a shift from precedents that focused on the practical im-
pact of the lawsuits. 191 In particular, Justice Ginsburg relied on the
Hewitt language that defined a prevailing party as a plaintiff who
benefited from a defendant's altered conduct. 192 Therefore, in Hewitt,
the lawsuit's practical effect on the parties' relationship established a
prevailing party, a test that could be fulfilled by the catalyst theory. 193
By the time of the Buckhannon holding, however, the crucial require-
ment had become the mere stamp of legal process. 194
When the smoke had cleared in Buckhannon, Chief Justice
Rehnquist had carried the majority in rejecting the catalyst theory for
the FHAA and the ADA. 195 As a result, a plaintiff could achieve pre-
vailing party status only by obtaining a final judgment on the merits
or a consent decree. 196 Many questions, however, remained unan-
185 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19 ' Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
04 See id. at 641-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Homier Distrib. Co., Inc. v. City of New
Bedford, No. 00-12410—GAO, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2372, at *8 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Feb. 13,
2002) (noting that Buckhannon prohibited award under catalyst theory due to lack of judi-
cially sanctioned change in parties' legal relationship).
198 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
198 See id.
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swered, especially concerning the outer limits of any remaining cata-
lyst theory validity.'"
W. THE AFTERMATH QF BUCKHANNON
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,
nearly every court that has required a prevailing party as a prerequi-
site to fee recovery has applied Buckhannon's judicial imprimatur test
to reject catalyst claims.'" Those courts that have awarded fees pursu-
ant to the catalyst theory have distinguished their language from the
FHAA or ADA versions of prevailing party language.'" While ac-
knowledging that the catalyst theory might not establish a prevailing
party, they continue to grant fees where the statute gives them discre-
tion to do so, regardless of prevailing party status. 200
Although Buckhannon explicitly rejected the catalyst theory only
in the FHAA and ADA contexts, courts have extrapolated its holding
to nearly every other fee-shifting statute that refers to a prevailing
197 See infra Part IV.
198 See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that Buckhannon ap-
plies to Social Security Act, and thus denying fees requested under Fees Act); Richardson
v. City of Boston, 279 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir, 2002) (holding that the catalyst theory may no
longer be used to award attorney's fees under the Fees Act); J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278
F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding catalyst theory invalid for Individuals with Disabili-
ties in Education Act plaintiffs); Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 273 F.3c1 690,
692-93 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to reject catalyst theory under Fees Act);
County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that
party prevails according to Buckhannon only after receiving some relief by the court); John-
son v. ITT Ind., Inc., 272 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Supreme Court's catalyst
rejection to all fee-shifting provisions, including Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); N.Y.
State Fed. of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 F.3d
154, 157 (2d Cir. 2001); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 261 F.3d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding catalyst theory invalid in ADA setting as a result of recent Buckhannon decision);
Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 100-01 (9th Cir. 2001); Renner v. Champion Health
Care Corp., 258 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's fee award under
Fair Labor Standards Act due to Buckhannon decision coining clown before appeal de-
cided); J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Stipp. 2c1 570, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Alcocer v. INS, No. 3:00—CV-2015—H, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 28, 2001) (applying Buckhannon in EAJA setting to deny attorney's fees tinder catalyst
theory); Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Stipp. 2c1 1272, 1277
(N.D. Fla. 2001) (recognizing the catalyst theory's invalidity after Buckhannon).
1" See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 (10th Cir. 2001)
(retaining validity of catalyst theory for Endangered Species Act because language allows
fee awards where appropriate); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed, Cl.
738, 745 (2001) (distinguishing EAJA mandate that courts "shall" award attorney's fees
from FHAA and ADA discretionary "may" award attorney's fees).
21* See Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 747.
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party.201
 Courts have relied on several statements from Buckhannon in
order to do so. 202 In 2001, in Miley v. Principi, the United States Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims referred to the Supreme Court's
statement that "Congress ... has authorized the award of attorney's
fees to the 'prevailing party' in numerous statutes in addition to those
at issue here."203 Similarly, in 2001, in Bennett v. Yoshina, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the Buckhan-
non Court had grouped the Fees Act with the FHAA and the ADA and
stated that the Court had interpreted Congress's fee-shifting statutes
consistently.204
 Hence, even though the Court spoke explicitly only to
the FHAA and ADA, the dicta that discussed the Fees Act and the
general reference to other fee-shifting statutes have been interpreted
to authorize courts to reject the catalyst theory in other contexts. 205
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that Buckhannon
overturned its earlier catalyst theory precedent under the Fees Act. 206
There, the plaintiffs filed suit against several state officials in Hawaii
after a referendum failed because the Hawaii Supreme Court tallied
all the blank ballots and over-votes as "no" votes, rather than non-
votes.207 The State of Hawaii later mooted this claim by passing a bill
201 See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (holding that Buckhannon applies to Social Security Act,
and thus denying fees requested under Fees Act); Richardson, 279 F.3d at 4 (holding that
the catalyst theory may no longer be used to award attorney's fees under the Fees Act);
J.C., 278 F.3d at 125 (holding catalyst theory invalid for Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act plaintiffs); Chambers, 273 F.3d at 692-93 (applying Buckhannon to reject
catalyst theory under Fees Act); County of Morris, 273 F.3d at 536 (noting that party prevails
according to Buckhannon only after receiving some relief by the court) ; Johnson, 272 F.3d at
500 (applying Supreme Court's catalyst rejection to all fee-shifting provisions, including
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); N.Y. State Fed, of Taxi Drivers, Inc., 272 F.3d at 157;
Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1029 (holding catalyst theory invalid in Americans with Disabilities Act
setting as a result of recent Buckhannon decision); Bennett, 259 F.3d at 100-01; Reimer, 258
F.3d at 727 (reversing district court's fee award under Fair Labor Standards Act due to
Buckhannon decision coming down before appeal decided); J.S. &M.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d at
577; Alcocer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, at *8-9 (applying Buckhannon in EAJA setting to
deny attorney's fees under catalyst theory); Nat 1 Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F.
Stipp. 2d at 1277 (recognizing the catalyst theory's invalidity after Buckhannon); Sileikis v.
Perryman, No. 01—C-944, 2001 WL 965503, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2001). But .see Brick-
wood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746 (distinguishing EAJA prevailing party language from that of the
. F1-1AA and ADA).
202 See, e.g., Miley v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 97, 98 (2001) (holding that Buckhannon rea-
soning should be applied in EAJA setting).
2°3 Id. at 98 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602).
2" See Bennett, 259 F.3d at 1100-01 (referring to Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602).
20
 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610; Bennett, 259 F.3d at 1100-01; Miley, 15 Vet. App. at
98.
206 Bennett, 259 F.3d at 1100.
207 Id. at 1099.
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that called for another election.208 The Ninth Circuit held that be-
cause the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckhannon had
cited the prevailing party provision of the Fees Act as nearly identical
to the corresponding FHAA and ADA provisions, there could be "no
doubt" that Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Buckhannon applied
to the Fees Act and, therefore, that the plaintiff in Bennett could not
recover fees under the catalyst theory," Thus, the Ninth Circuit held
that the catalyst theory no longer applied to the Fees Act and ac-
knowledged that its precedents to the contrary had been over-
turned. 21°
In addition to interpreting Buckhannon's legal assessments to re-
ject catalyst claims, some courts have applied the policy rationale be-
hind the Court's decision."' In 2001, in Sileikis v. Perryman, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois faced a claim
demanding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
adjudicate the two applications for admission to the country that the
plaintiff had submitted a year earlier. 212 Midway through the case, the
INS delivered a decision denying the plaintiff permission to reapply
for admission, mooting the claim. 213 Because the plaintiff had com-
pelled the INS to resolve the status of his applications, he applied for
attorney's fees on the basis of the catalyst theory. 214 The court, how-
ever, declined to grant fees because doing so might provide the INS
with a disincentive to issue its decisions. 213 In addition, the court
would be forced to speculate on the subjective motivations behind the
1NS's conduct change, which would make the court's job much more
cumbersome. 218 Thus, the plaintiff could not recover fees even
though he had motivated the INS to fulfill its duties. 217 The Supreme
Court's policy rationale has therefore borne fruit in courts that fear
increasing workloads, allowing them to evade difficult issues as be-
yond their jurisdiction. 210
206 Id. at 1100.
269 Id.
210 Id.
211 See, e.g., Sikikis, 2001 WL 965503, at *3.
212 Id. at *1 .
213 Id.
214 See id.
215 Id. at *3.
216 Sileihis, 2001 WL 965503, at *3.
217 See id.
218 see id.
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One court has even gone so far as to determine that a private set-
tlement agreement does not confer prevailing party status upon the
plaintiff. 219 Borrowing from Buckhannon's requirement for a judgment
on the merits, in 2001, in J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Central School District,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that settlements did not include the judicial imprimatur
necessary to create a prevailing party. 22° The plaintiff in Ramapo was
forced to send her son to a special state school that could adequately
administer to his learning disabilities. 221 Afterward, she settled with
her son's former school district for the cost of attendance at the
boarding school, and then applied for reimbursement of "consultant
services."222 The court responded by holding that a plaintiff would
need to incorporate a private settlement into a consent decree to pre-
vail.223
Several cases have distinguished Buckhannon and awarded fees on
the basis of the catalyst theory. 224 In Center for Biological Diversity v. Nor-
ton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted
the plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to the catalyst theory and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).225 The ESA provides that a court may
award costs and fees in citizen suits "whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate."226 The court distinguished this "appropri-
ate" language from the "prevailing party" definition in Buckhannon
that excluded the catalyst theory.227 Because the ESA permits a court
to grant fees where appropriate, the plaintiff could receive fees if it
had catalyzed the defendant's change in position. 228 Thus, if the cen-
ter could prove that its request to list the Arkansas River shiner as en-
dangered caused the secretary to do just that, the catalyst theory ap-
plied and the plaintiff could recover attorney's fees. 2"
Fees have also been awarded to a catalytic plaintiff based upon a
defendant's change in position and a trial court, at a temporary re-
219 J.S. &M.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
22° See id.
221 Id. at 572.
222 Id. at 573.
223 See id. at 575.
224 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1080 n.2.
225
 Id. at 1081.
226 Id. at 1080 (citing The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (4) (2000)).
227 See id. at 108011.2.
228 Id. at 1081.
229 See Ch: for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1081.
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straining order (TRO) hearing, finding unlawful activity. 2" In 2001, in
Brickwood Contractors v. United States, the United States Court of Federal
Claims granted the petitioner's request for fees by distinguishing the
EAJA from the statutes in question in Buckhannon.231 The EAJA allows
plaintiffs to file claims against governmental actors who are not
fulfilling a statutory mandate.232 The court first distinguished Buck-
hannon's FHAA and ADA context, suggesting that any reference to
other statutory authority could be only dictum. 233 Second, the Brick-
wood court interpreted Chief Justice Rehnquist's list of similar prevail-
ing party statutes as exhaustive, noting it did not refer to the EAJA. 234
Third, the court had already decided that the plaintiff in Brickwood
had forced the defendant's change in behavior, whereas the Buckhan-
non Court never made such a finding. 235 Additionally, the EAJA lan-
guage mandating that a state "shall" award fees to the prevailing party
distinguished it from the FHAA and ADA language cited in Buckhan-
non stating that the court "may" award fees. 236
In rejecting one of Buckhannon's policy concerns, the Brickwood
court determined that the EAJA's inherent safeguards would avoid
compensation for meritless claims. 237 Specifically, the EAJA requires
the plaintiff to prove that the government's position was not "justified
to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." 238 Even if the gov-
ernment had changed its position to accommodate the plaintiffs
claim, a court could only award fees if the government's original posi-
tion was not substantially justifiable. 239 The court would accordingly
avoid awarding fees for a meritless claim by evaluating the govern-
ment's position to determine whether it was substantially justified. 24°
New cases continue to apply Buckhannon to catalyst claims on a
daily basis. 241 At present, these cases are holdovers whose merits were
decided before Buckhannon was handed down, but which are now in
2" See, e.g., Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 743,749.
gm See id. at 745.
222 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
2" See Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 744.
"4 Id.
2" Id.
"6 Id. at 745-46.
"7 Id. at 746.
2" See Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746.
"g See id. (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (D) (2000)).
24g Id. at 746-47.
241 See, e.g., N.Y. State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. , 272 F.3d at 157 (holding that Buckhan-
non's reasoning required a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship under
Section 1988).
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the stage of attorney's fees requests. 242 It will be impossible to assess
the effect of Buckhannon on overall litigation rates until these cases
have concluded.243 The most profound effects, however, will arise with
new claims as plaintiffs become overly discerning in litigating these
claims in light of Buckhannon, and lawyers in turn carefully choose
those plaintiffs. 244
V. BUCKHANNON UNLEASHED
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. vs West Virginia Depart-
ment of Health and Human Resources, the Supreme Court erroneously
overturned thirty years of fee-shifting jurisprudence by eliminating
the catalyst theory for recovery under the FHAA and ADA. 245 First,
the majority misinterpreted the legislative history of the Fees Act by
deeming it ambiguous on the availability of catalyst claims. 246 Second,
Chief Justice Rehnquist underestimated the chilling effect of the abo-
lition of the catalyst theory on future litigation because of the lack of
evidence proffered to prove such an effect. 247 Third, the majority ig-
nored the fact that most environmental and civil rights claimants re-
quest primarily equitable relief in its unreasonable suggestion that a
claim for damages would serve as a proxy for otherwise mooted equi-
table claims.248 Fourth, the majority underestimated the number of
defendants who could meet the absolutely clear standard to moot
claims. 249 Fifth, the Court overstated the threat of nuisance suits being
242 See id. at 155.
243 See id.
244 See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
246 See 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001).
246 See id. at 608 (stating that Congress would have to endorse the catalyst theory ex-
plicitly to overcome the American Rule's presumption against awarding attorney's fees).
247 See id.; Laura E. Flenniken, No More Plain Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 DENY. U. L.
REV. 477, 505 (1994) (stating that the "most obvious objection to the Farrar decision is its
potential chilling effect on civil rights litigation"); Daniel L. Lowery, "Prevailing Party"
Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-Shifting's Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1475-
76 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court is achieving success at eliminating classes of
civil rights cases).
248
 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10; Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 785 (1989) (plaintiffs challenged constitutionality of communica-
tions prohibition between teachers and unions during schoolday); Hewitt v. Helms, 482
U.S. 755, 757-58 (1987) (filing suit to vindicate due process rights); Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 426 (1983) (bringing lawsuit challenging constitutionality of treatment at
state mental health hospital).
249 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-10.
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brought in the guise of catalyst theory cases. 250 Finally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist incorrectly concluded that defendants would be more
likely to alter their positions in the absence of the catalyst theory. 251
Regardless of these criticisms, the Buckhannon decision has been
accepted by nearly every federal court of appeals and utilized to
eliminate the catalyst theory from prevailing party discussions. 252 Un-
derstanding that the Buckhannon holding will likely remain valid case
law, it should be distinguished from other catalyst theory cases to
promote vindication of civil or environmental rights by those parties
who cannot afford litigation fees. 255 In addition, Congress should pre-
empt the possibility of further Buckhannon expansion by adopting a
prevailing party definition that explicitly includes the catalyst the-
ory.254 Until the courts or CongresS remedy Buckhannonts strict pre-
vailing party requirements, the vindication of critical civil and envi-
ronmental rights will continue to be lethargic. 255
In Buckhannon, the Court exceeded its authority by substituting
its own definition of prevailing party for that stated in the legislative
history of the Fees Act. 256 Instead of adopting the Senate report's as-
sertion that a party could prevail without obtaining formal relief,
Chief Justice Rehnquist required a party to procure a material altera-
tion in its legal relationship with the opposing party.257 In shaping this
definition, he deemed statements that a prevailing party need not be
limited to plaintiffs who received a "final judgment following a full
trial on the merits" ambiguous in light of the American Rule. 258 The
majority evaded the fact that the legislative history of the Fees Act ex-
pressly refuted the American Rule in such circumstances. 259
 In fact,
23° See id. at 610 (stating that the elimination of the catalyst theory would avoid district
court analysis of the defendant's subjective motivations in changing conduct).
251 See id.
252 See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
253 See, e.g., Brickwood Contractors v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 743, 745 (2001) (dis-
tinguishing Buckhannon).
254 See S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912.
25' See Lowery, supra note 247, at 1975-77. The Court's reduction of the class of eligi-
ble plaintiffs to those who reach a final judgment, settlement, or consent decree will penal-
ize plaintiffs who bring claims that are then mooted by defendants. See id. Clever defen-
dants will avoid any fee-shifting liability at all by altering behavior before judgment, which
places an unbearable financial burden on plaintiffs. See id.
2'6 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607.
257 See id.; see also S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5912.
25" See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08.
259 Seel -1.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912.
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the American Rule's adverse social impact in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society, in which the plaintiff had succeeded in
bringing about positive environmental change but then failed to ob-
tain attorney's fees, led directly to the enactment of the Fees Act. 26°
Congress acknowledged its purpose by stating in the Fees Act that a
party should receive fees for obtaining the requested relief even in the
absence of a final judgment. 261 Consequently, the Supreme Court in-
correctly overruled Congress's express desire to subordinate the
American Rule to the emerging doctrine that a prevailing party could
obtain attorney's fees even in the absence of a final judgment. 262
The Buckhannon majority also minimized the chilling impact that
the abolition of the catalyst theory would have on future rights vindi-
cation.20 Chief Justice Rehnquist improvidently stated that, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, he would assume that the Fourth
Circuit's repudiation of the catalyst theory had not diminished the
overall number of civil rights cases before the Fourth Circuit. 2" Even
allowing arguendo that this assumption is accurate, several of the fol-
lowing factors could explain the Fourth Circuit's continuing
caseload. 2"
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning does not take into ac-
count the lag time between the date a case is filed and its conclu-
sion.2" Even though the Fourth Circuit decided S-1 & S-2 By and
Through P-1 C.? P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina in 1994,
many of the court's current cases could have been in the docket since
that date. 267 Because civil rights and environmental cases are among
the most complex types of litigation, they require even longer to con-
clude than cases in other genres. 268 Thus, the cases in the Fourth Cir-
cuit's docket at the time of the Buckhannon deliberations likely repre-
26° See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,240 (1975); S. REP.
No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5912.
261 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5,7 (1976); S. REp. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908,5912.
262 See S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5912.
263 See Flenniken, supra note 247, at 505; Lowery, supra note 247, at 1475-77.
264 See Flenniken, supra note 247, at 505; Lowery, supra note 247, at 1475-77.
265 See infra notes 266-272 and accompanying text.
266 See Flenniken, supra note 247, at 505; Lowery, supra note 247, at 1475-77.
267 See Flenniken, supra note 247, at 505 (referring to extraordinary length of civil
rights cases, including nineteen-year-long Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992)).
268 See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177,1191 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Envi-
ronmental litigation is tremendously complex, lengthy, and expensive.").
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sented cases filed both before and after the S-/ & S-2 rejection of the
catalyst theory, in unknown quantities. 269
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation that there was no
evidence of a Fourth Circuit decline in civil rights cases fails to con-
sider those cases filed soon after Buckhannon to challenge the reach of
its holding.270 When a potentially important holding is delivered,
plaintiffs who may be affected often file a variation on the seminal
case to determine the limits of their continuing rights. 2" In the case
at hand, a plaintiff just like Buckhannon might choose to file a case in
the aftermath of S-/ & 5-2 because it purported to reject the catalyst
theory. 272
In addressing the mootness argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist
conceded that an action for damages will continue to lie even if there
is no longer any basis for equitable relief. 273 This concession is unreal-
istic because the majority of catalyst plaintiffs file their lawsuits pre-
cisely to effect behavioral change, not to collect damages for the in-
appropriate behavior. 274 For example, in Buckhannon, the plaintiff
filed suit to enjoin the State of West Virginia from closing its busi-
ness. 276 Although Buckhannon would certainly have accepted dam-
ages for loss of earnings, its primary motive was to continue operat-
ing.276 Because the case was initially based in a claim for equitable
relief, even if damages were granted, fee-shifting law might have de-
termined that the plaintiff should have been compensated only for
that portion of the fees deemed reasonable, or that attributed directly
to the damages claim.277 Thus, Buckhannon would have recovered
damages, its secondary concern, and the lawyer would have been
269 §ee Flenniken, supra note 247, at 505.
270 See id. (Buckhannon itself filed for attorney's fees even in the wake of Farrar, which
appeared to eliminate the catalyst theory from the definition of prevailing party).
271 See, e.g., Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738, 745 (2001)
(holding that Buckhannon did not apply in EAJA setting, though the EAJA language was
similar to that of the ADA and FHAA, explicitly rejected in Buckhannon).
212 See id.
175 See id.
-274 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10; Garland, 489 U.S. at 785 (plaintiffs challenged
constitutionality of communications prohibition between teachers and unions during
schoolday); Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 757-58 (filing suit to vindicate due process rights); Hensley,
461 U.S. at 426 (bringing lawsuit challenging constitutionality of treatment at state mental
health hospital).
275
	 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600-01.
276 See id.
217 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34 (calculating attorney's fees based on number of
hours reasonably expended and reasonable hourly rate, and determining that claims that
were unsuccessful should recover no fees).
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poorly compensated for the total time put into the case.278 This result
would have contributed further to hindering lawyers from accepting
cases on a contingency basis. 279
The majority also failed to distinguish between public and private
defendants and underestimated the ability of public catalyst theory
defendants to meet the strict mootness standard. 28° A defendant can
moot a claim only if it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." 281 Because a
public statutory or regulatory response carries greater legal perma-
nence than a private party's internal policy change, however, a public
entity will more easily meet this absolute certainty standard.282
 Be-
cause many catalyst theory cases are filed against public parties that
enact changes of this more permanent nature, plaintiffs in such cases
may very likely find their cases to be moot. 283
Just as the majority rashly dismissed the plaintiffs concerns, they
overvalued the supposed dangers of the catalyst theory. 284 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist discussed the hazard of awarding fees against a party
that had changed its position merely to avoid the hassle of a nuisance
suit.283 Although this fear of abuse of the legal system has merit, it un-
derestimates both the energy that a plaintiff must expend in a case
278 See id.
278 See id.
50
 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-10.
281 See id. (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000)).
282 See id. at 600-01 (finding that legislation enacted after suit was filed eliminated of-
fensive provisions).
283 See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 271 (4th Cir. 2002) (claim against Virginia De-
partment of Social Services for withholding welfare support in violation of Social Security
Act and constitutional rights); Richardson v. City of Boston, 279 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002)
(claim filed against city and police department)J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119,
120 (2d Cir. 2002) (claim against school district's policies concerning Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act plaintiffs); Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 273 F.3d
690, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs challenged defendant state agency's Medicaid eligi-
bility rules); County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2001)
(claimed first amendment right to gather and rally on courthouse steps against county
denial of permit for such activity); N.Y. State Fed. of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester
County Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 272 E3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs sued West-
chester County law requiring licensing of drivers picking up or dropping off passengers in
County); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (individuals and organi-
zations filed claim against state officials and entities of federal court for constitutional
violations of election procedures).
284 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
288 See id. at 606.
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and the morals of a lawyer who would accept such a case. 286 Because
many plaintiffs do not have the time to file frivolous lawsuits, and
most lawyers respect their ethical obligation to file non-frivolous
claims, the incidence of a meritless claim would be low. 287
In addition, Justice Ginsburg's dissent insightfully recommends
that courts could value the merits of the underlying claim in doling
out fees according to their discretion. 288 Even if a plaintiff filed a
meritless claim, a lawyer represented this plaintiff, and the defendant
changed behavior to meet the plaintiff's frivolous demands, the ulti-
mate authority for awarding fees would lie in the court. 289 The court
could then reduce the fees commensurate with its valuation of the
underlying claim.290
The majority's similar concern that the possibility of catalyst fees
would deter defendants from changing their positions is un-
founded.291 As Justice Ginsburg noted, such defendants could have
avoided suits altogether by altering their behavior before a cause of
action had arisen. 292 In addition, defendants faced with the possibility
of exorbitant trial fees would surely rather expose themselves to the
possibility of a much smaller catalyst theory liability by altering their
behavior during the case. 298 Thus, defendants who weighed the alter-
natives would discover that they would suffer less liability if they al-
tered their behavior toward the plaintiff as early as possible.294
Although the Buckhannon Court's reasoning may have been
flawed, lower courts must learn to apply or distinguish it.295 Hence,
with the catalyst theory officially abolished for the FHAA and ADA,
and effectively abolished under many other statutes with similar "pre-
vailing party" language, courts can produce equitable results only by
distinguishing those few statutes that are arguably outside the reach of
Buckhannon's holding. 296 In particular, because many catalyst cases are
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See id. at 639-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9" See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 639-40 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
29° See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291 See id. at 608.
292 See id. at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"3 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"4 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2" See id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
286 See, e.g., Brickwood, 49 Fed. CI. at 743.
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filed in opposition to governmental action, distinguishing the EAJA
would preserve the catalyst theory in many cases. 297
In Brickwood Contractors v. United States, the United States Court of
Federal Claims distinguished Buckhannon in its EAJA analysis on the
basis of both different facts and EAJA's textual safeguards. 298 First,
Judge Horn stated that unlike the case before him, neither the plain-
tiffs nor the Court were responsible for the successful resolution of
the Buckhannon dispute.299 Instead, the non-party West Virginia legis-
lature satisfied Buckhannon's claim by removing the statutory self-
preservation requirement for nursing homes.") Because the legisla-
ture was never a party to the case, Judge Horn posits that it would be
difficult to prove a direct causation, so that even reliance on a valid
catalyst theory would have failed. 301 The Buckhannon holding should
therefore be applied only in those instances in which the plaintiff
could not prove the requirements of the catalyst theory. 392
Additionally, the Brickwood court distinguished the EAJA's lan-
guage, which says that fees shall be awarded, from the fee-shifting
provisions at issue in Buckhannon 303 In contrast to the FHAA or ADA,
the EAJA requires that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses ... unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified
or that special circumstances make an award unjust:104 The manda-
tory language indicates that a court can withhold fees only if the gov-
ernment can justify its posidon. 898 This has two ramifications for EAJA
litigation: courts have a nearly mandatory duty to award fees, and the
statute itself provides a filter through which prevailing parties must
demonstrate that they legitimately deserve attorney's fees. 306 Thus, the
EAJA inherently refutes the argument that the catalyst theory might
reward nuisance plaintiffs because the government can avoid fee li-
ability merely through proving that its position was "justified to a de-
297 See id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 744.
360 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
3° 1 See Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 744.
3°2
 See id.
303 See id. at 745.
304 See id. at 746.
3°3 See id.
300 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A) (2000).
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gree that could satisfy a reasonable person."307 Even if the government
altered its behavior to benefit the plaintiff, it would not be liable for
fees unless its original position was unjustified."
In addition to the EAJA, the catalyst theory should still be valid
for fee-shifting statutes that do not require that a plaintiff be a prevail-
ing party to receive fees." For example, the ESA provides for courts
to award attorney's fees "whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate."310 In the context of the Clean Air Act, which has similar
language, the Supreme Court has held that fees are appropriate only
if the plaintiff has received "some degree of success on the merits." 311
In the absence of adjudication on the merits to show some success,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has found
fees appropriate only if the plaintiff proves to be the catalyst behind
the defendant's change in conduct. 312 Thus, the catalyst theory should
still be applied to plaintiffs who file suit under fee-shifting statutes
that grant fees where appropriate. 316
Whether or not courts continue to read the catalyst theory out of
the definition of prevailing party, Congress should amend its fee-
shifting statutes to include the catalyst theory. 314 The Buckhannon de-
cision, just like that in Alyeska twenty-five years ago, is an implied call
to arms to Congress to codify a critical aspect of current common law,
the catalyst theory.316 In Alyeska, the Court would not defy the Ameri-
can Rule to grant fees to the prevailing party, so Congress responded
by enacting fee-shifting statutes that expressly defied the American
Rule. 916 Congress should take the same action and expressly defy the
Buckhannon holding by inserting a definition of prevailing party that
includes the catalyst theory within each fee-shifting statute. 317 The
plain meaning of the prevailing party definition would then compel
3°7 See Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988))
368 See id. at 746-47.
3013 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (4) (2000).
31° See id.
511 SeeRuckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983).
312 See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995).
313 SeeCtr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2001).
314 SeeS. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912.
515 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269.
316 See H.R. REP. No, 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5912.
517 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912.
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courts to apply the catalyst theory to appropriate plaintiffs for attor-
ney fee recovery.'"
Legislative codification of the catalyst theory would be com-
pletely consistent with the legislative history surrounding the early
fee-shifting statute, the Fees Act. 3" The Senate report on the act as-
serted that final judgments could be unnecessary to obtain fees with
statements such as, "[Pjarties may be considered to have prevailed
when they vindicate rights . . . without formally obtaining relief."320
Hence, Congress clearly intended "prevailing party" to have the
broadest possible reach, a reach which would surely include the cata-
lyst theory.321
In addition, Congress could dispel much of the criticism con-
cerning the catalyst theory's arbitrariness by enacting clearly defined
standards for plaintiffs to use in applying the catalyst theory. 322 Con-
gress could import aspects of prior case law to require that a catalyst
plaintiff meet justice Ginsburg's three-part threshold test: (1) that the
plaintiff present a genuine, colorable claim, rather than a nuisance
suit; (2) that the defendant provide some of the benefit sought by the
plaintiff; and (3) that the plaintiff's suit be a substantial or significant
cause of the defendant's change in behavior. 323 The requirement of a
genuine claim would allay concerns that the plaintiff filed a non-
meritorious claim for its nuisance value. 324 The fact that the plaintiff
benefited from the change in behavior would prove that the plaintiff
achieved some degree of success on the claim, and so could be said to
have prevailed.325 Finally, a plaintiff would be forced to prove that the
claim caused the defendant's action, so that the plaintiff would not be
compensated for filing a claim after the defendant had decided to
act. 326 Thus, Congress could simply ensure the catalyst theory's viabil-
ity by codifying the methods by which courts had evaluated catalyst
claims prior to Buckhannon. 327
315 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08 (refusing to apply catalyst theory after finding
congressional intent ambiguous).
5/9 See MR. REP. No. 94-1558, at 5, 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5912.
326 See S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.GA.N. 5908, 5912.
321 See id.
3" See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608, 610.
523 See id. at 626-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
524 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
325 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
326 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
327
 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608, 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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In the absence of a congressional response that would mitigate
the civil and environmental rights violations that will occur without
the catalyst theory, courts should fashion an efficient substitute. 328
One scholar, Joel Trotter, has proposed the voluntary cessation doc-
trine as a valid alternative. 329 The voluntary cessation doctrine pro-
vides a court with the continuing ability to render a final judgment if
it feels that the defendant may have changed behavior only temporar-
ily."8 Thus, as suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Buckhannon
opinion, a defendant can moot a claim only by proving to a certainty a
permanent discontinuance of the unlawful behavior at issue."' The
voluntary cessation rule itself, however, is not without hazard. 332 For
example, a cynical plaintiff who wishes a permanent resolution might
continue to press for an injunction even after the defendant has
ceased the unlawful activity.333 In such instances, a court will generally
refrain from issuing such an injunction unless the future of the de-
fendant's self-imposed ban is uncertain. 334 Hence, this doctrine can be
engaged with little difficulty by private parties who can show through
writings that they have changed their policies, and even more easily by
governmental bodies that can point to newly enacted statutory or
regulatory authority.335 In addition, after Farrar v. Hobby, an enforce-
able judgment does not automatically establish eligibility for attor-
ney's fees. 338 The plaintiff must secure a substantial award that will
indicate the monumental effort put into the case by the plaintiff and
thus garner a large fee recovery. 337 Therefore, the voluntary cessation
doctrine will certainly prove helpful in obtaining final judgments, but
only under very limited circumstances, and so cannot fully replace the
catalyst theory. 338
The catalyst theory's continuing vitality is crucial to maintaining
the optimal level of civil rights and environmental defense. 339
 Without
the risk of extra fee liability, a defendant may violate a plaintiff's rights
528 See Trotter, supra note 30, at 1450-53.
329 See id. at 1450.
330
	 id. at 1450-51,
551 See id. at 1451.
552
 See id. at 1453.
"5 See Trotter, supra note 30, at 1453.
554 See id.
555 See id.
"8 See id.
337 e Farrar, 506 U.S. 103,115 (1992).
338 See Trotter, supra note 30, at 1453.
"9 See supra notes 263-272 and accompanying text.
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throughout the course of litigation before altering behavior to moot
the claim.34° A plaintiffs attorney would evaluate this possibility and
refuse to take the case at the risk of large pecuniary losses. 341 On the
contrary, with a viable catalyst theory, a defendant would more quickly
comply with the plaintiffs claim to avoid protracted litigation and the
accompanying fees. 342
CONCLUSION
The catalyst theory evolved as a method to award attorney's fees
to citizens who had vindicated their legal rights without judicial de-
cree. In drafting the Fees Act, Congress recognized that such plaintiffs
were worthy of this reward and so implicitly included the theory in
the language of the prevailing party legislative history. In 2001, how-
ever, the Supreme Court eviscerated Congress's statutory fee-shifting
intent when it squarely abandoned the catalyst theory in the FHAA
and ADA settings in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Vir-
ginia Department of Health and Human Resources.
Regardless of the Buckhannon decision, the critical importance of
a viable catalyst theory should compel lower courts and scholars to
continue to search for ways to apply the catalyst theory in the civil
rights and environmental contexts, distinguishing these areas of the
law from either the FHAA or ADA. In addition, Congress should react
to the Court's implied request for a clear prevailing party definition
by promptly enacting catalyst theory legislation and setting guidelines
by which it may be implemented. As the civil rights and environ-
mental needs of this country continue to expand, the courts should
allocate the fee burden appropriately by requiring defendants to pay
for the litigation engendered by their unlawful actions.
KYLE A. LORING
54° See supra notes 273-279 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 273-279 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 273-279 and accompanying text.
